That is getting yourself to b l u s h -by a r o u t e -but it could not possi b l y count as b l u shing at will.
Consider next the m a n w h o brings it about that he blushes by thinking of an e m b a r r a s s i n g scene.
That is g e tting a bit nearer to blu s h i n g at will, but it is perhaps best d e s cribed as maki n g oneself b l u s h at will.
The best candidate of all w ould be somebody who could just b l u s h in m u c h the way that one can h old o n e 's breath.
Fro m the example it seems that the k ind of direct beli e v i n g he has in m ind wou l d be an instance of b a s i c action:
I w o u l d do it directly, not by doing something else.
A s s u m i n g the si t u a t i o n is the n o r m a l one, I act basically, for example, w h e n I raise m y hand to answer a qu e s tion, or bite m y fingernail, or shake m y head in denial, or tap my toe in time to the music.
I do not need to do anything to b r i n g it about that I do these things; I do th e m directly, simply as the result of m y will, just like that.
I could, of course, p e r f o r m these actions nonbasically; suppose that instead of raising m y right hand directly, I lift it w i t h m y left hand.
In that case I have done s omething to bri n g it about that m y right hand rises, therefore in W i l l i a m s ' sense I have not raised it at w i l l (though I have "made m y s e l f [raise it] at will").Â n example of basic action in the m e n t a l r e a l m is useful.
In the normal case, w h e n I am imagining s omething I do it basically, directly. If I am asked to imagine snow falling or that I am in bed n o w asleep, I can directly do it.
I do not need to get m y s e l f to imagine it by doing * Î other things.
As it might be put, the imagination directly responds to the will. The question Williams raises is whether it would be pos sible for believing to be like imagining in this respect.
Clarification of the concept of belief at w i l l shows, then, that some of the cases one mi ght think wo u l d be instances of it in fact are not.
Williams does not deny that h a v i n g a project of getting oneself to believe something mig h t in fact result in o n e 's coming to hold the belief in q uestion (though he says that such a project would be f lv e r y deeply irrational" (150)).
For example, one could focus on the fa v o r able data and not on the adverse, try to d i s c redit u n f a v o r a b l e da t a through considerations of fallibility of testimony, etc., and co n s t a n t ly imagine what it would be like if the belief w e r e true.^ Such a case w ould be like that of the m a n w h o brings it about that he blushes by thinking of embar r a s s i n g scenes.
So cases w h e r e one succeeds in a c q u i r ing a belief as the result of a project, or cases w h e r e one does certain things so that o n e 's degree of credence g r adually diminishes to the point of no longer amounting to belief, are not cases of acquiring b e liefs at will.
The Argument W i l l i a m s ' argument occurs in the space of one paragraph:
If I could acquire a belief at will, I could acquire it w h e t h e r it was true or not ; mo r e o v e r I w o u l d k n o w that I could acquire it w hether it was true or not.
If in full consciousness I could will to acquire a 'b e l i e f ' irrespective of its truth, it is u nclear that before the event I could s e r i ously think of it as a belief, i.e. as something purpo r t i n g to represent reality.
At the ver y least, there must be a r e s t r i c t i o n on what is the case after the event; since I could not then, in full consciousness, regard this as a b e lief of mine, i.e. s o mething I take to be true, and also k n o w that I acquired it at will. W i t h regard to no belief could I k n o w -or, if all this is to be done in full consciousness, e v e n s u s p e c tthat I had acquired it at will. But if I can acquire beliefs at will, I m u s t k n o w that I a m able to do this; and could I k n o w that
I was capable of this f e a t , if wit h regard to every feat of this kind w h i c h I had per f ormed I n e c e s s a r i l y had to believe that it h a d not taken place? (148)
Though sometimes I mi ght have to do it n o n -b a s i c a l l y , as, for e x a m ple, w h e n what I want to imagine is v e r y p a i nful to me, and I can only come to imagine it by leading up to it in imagining other things first.
g°S ee H.H. Price, "Belief and Wil l , " Proc e e d i n g s of the A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , Supplementary Vol u m e 28 (1954), for a full d e s c r i p t i o n of such recipes for getting oneself to bel i e v e s o m e thing one wants to believe.
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The argument proceeds from the claim that I cannot have a certain attitude-namely that of regarding a belief of m i n e as h a v i n g b e e n acquired at w i l l -to the c o n c lusion that I cannot believe at will. It does so v i a some intermediate claims:
that since I n e c e s s a r i l y cannot regard any belief of m in e as h a v i n g b e e n acquired at wi l l it follows that I cannot k n o w I have the ability to b e l ieve at will; and that I must k now I have the ab i lity if I in fact have it.
It w ill be useful to r eorganize the e s s e ntial claims in the p a s sage into the form of premises and conclusions.
In this r e c o n s t r u c t i o n I continue to use W i l l i a m s 1 o wn words, w i t h some n o n -e s s e n t i a l m o d i f i c a tions (e.g., turning his ques t i o n into a statement).
Since the scope of the m odal terms is made sufficiently clear by the context so as not to require formal specification, I leave the argument as informally stated, noting that each premise must express a n e c e s s a r y truth if it is to follow that the c onclusion is also necessary.
(1) If I could acquire a belief at will, then in full consciousness I could wi l l to acquire a belief irrespective of its truth.
(2) If in full consciousness I could w i l l to acquire a belief irres pective of its truth, then b efore the event I could not think of it as a belief.
(3) If in full consciousness I could w i l l to acquire a b elief irres pective of its truth, then after the event I could not in full consciousness regard it as a b e lief o f min e and also k n o w that I acquired it at will.
(4) Therefore, w i t h regard to no belief could I k n o w that I had acquired it at will.
(5) If w ith respect to every a c q u i s i t i o n of a belief at w i l l I had performed I nec e s s a r i l y h ad to b e l ieve that it did not take place, then I could not k n o w that I was able to acquire b eliefs at will.
(6) Therefore, I cannot k n o w that I am able to acquire beliefs at will.
(7) If I can acquire beliefs at will, I must k n o w that I am able to acquire beliefs at will.
(8) Therefore,I cannot acquire b e l iefs at will.
It is first important to raise some issues about the logical form of the argument.
(3) and (4) suggest that the m a i n issue concerns w h e t h e r or not I could k n o w that I have acquired b eliefs at will.
But this is misleading.
The issue does not involve the truth or the justi f i c a t i o n for the c l aim that I have acquired beliefs at will; rather it is concerned wi t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of my thinking that I have.
It is b e cause knowledge requires belief that (3) and (4) are true.
Note that the antecedent in (5) makes a claim about belief, not knowledge. If this antecedent is to be taken to be e q u i valent to or implied by (4)-and it must be for (6) to follow from (4) and (5)-then at least in (4) 'k n o w ' should be replace d by 'b e l i e v e 1 , for m y not k n o w i n g something does not imply m y not b e l i e v i n g it.^
Therefore, (4) should be replaced by ( 4 1) :
( 4 f) Therefore, w i t h regard to no b elief could I believe that I had acquired it at will.
And since it is clear that the intent in (3) is the same, for clarity (3) should be replaced by ( 3 '):
( 3 ') If in full consciousness I could w i l l to acquire a belief irre spective of its truth, then after the event I could not in full consciousness regard it as a belief of mi n e and also b e l ieve that I had acquired it at will.
However, even wi t h these substitutions, the argument is not v a l i d as it stands:
( 4 f) still does not imply the antecedent of (5).
( 4 f) claims that I cannot believe I have acquired beliefs at will. The antecedent of (5) says that I have to believe of every b e l i e v i n g at w i l l that it did not take place.
( 4 f) is c ompatible w i t h m y hav i n g no opinion one way or the other about w h e t h e r I have acquired beliefs at will; it m e r e l y denies the p o s s i b i l i t y that I b e l i e v e that I have. The antecedent of (5), however, states that I b e l ieve of every case w h ere I have acquired a belief at w i l l that it did not take place.
The r e q u i r e ment of ( 4 f), that I not b elieve I have, therefore does not imply that of (5), that I believe I have not.
The revision that best seems to b r i n g the p r e m i s e in line w i t h W i l l i a m s ' intention is the w e a k e n i n g of (5), rather than the s t rength ening of ( 4 '); if strengthened (to read, for example, '' wit h respect to every belief of mine, I must b e l ieve that it was not acquired at w i l l " ), ( 4 ') w i l l not be implied by (2) and (3).
(5) should therefore be revised to read: (5') If wi t h respect to ev e r y a c q u i s i t i o n of a belief at w i l l I had perfo r m e d it is n e c e s s a r y that I not b elieve it took place, then I could not k n o w that I was able to acquire beliefs at will. A f ter attempting to determine what this insight is and exami n i n g its p l a u s i bility, I turn to a cons i d e r a t i o n of the a r g u m e n t 's second stage [(5f)-(7)], which attempts to show that since I cannot bel i e v e of a belief that I have acquired it at will, it is impossible for me to k n o w that I have the ability, and since if I had the ability it w o u l d be possible for me to k n o w that I do, I c a n 't be l i e v e at will.
The First Stage of the Argument
In support of (1), Wi l liams claims, !,I f I could acquire a belief at will, I could acquire it w h e ther it was true or not; mo r e o v e r I wo u l d k n o w that I could acquire it w h e t h e r it was true or n o t . " The context makes it clear that he thinks a further consequence is that I could in full consciousness will to acquire a bel i e f irrespective of its truth. W h y does Willi a m s think these consequences follow?
To determine the natu r e of the argument here, it is first n e cessary to clarify what Williams means by the phrases "acquiring a belief irrespective of its truth," "whether it is true or not," w h i c h he uses interchangeably. This is not as easy as it m a y seem, for there is an obvious i n t e r p retation of these phrases under w h i c h all of our beliefs are acquired irrespective of their truth, w h e t h e r or not they are true -yet this p h e n o m e n o n is not at all problematic.
As skeptics often remind us, the ways in w h i c h we acquire beliefs do not guarantee that w e arrive at true beliefs.
Therefore, ev e n though we believe of each belief of ours that it is true we k n o w that it is likely that some of them are false.
It is a t r u i s m that we can come to believe that something is true even though it is actually false, and so come to believe it wheth e r or not it is true.
In this sense, each of our beliefs is acquired "irrespective of its truth." But this fact is compatible w i t h both belief and awareness of belief; I can come to b e lieve a p r o p o s i t i o n (and k n o w that I b e l ieve it) wh i l e k n o wing that I acquire m y beliefs "whether or not they are true."
Williams clearly has another sense of "irrespective of truth" in mind, since no problem relevant here arises from the fact that the pro cess of belief-acquisition allows acquisition of false beliefs. We can discover this sense by examining more closely the phenomenon of acquir ing beliefs at will. Acqui r i n g a belief at w i l l is acq u i r i n g a belief directly, basically. As wi t h other basic actions, I can p e r f o r m it at will so long as other neces s a r y conditions are fulfilled.
I can raise my hand when e v e r I want (so long as m y musc l e s are o p e r a t i n g correctly, I am not p h y s i c a l ly prevented, etc.).
Wi l l i a m s seems to think that similarly, if I could believe at will it would be p o s sible for me to come to believe F-2 w h a t e v e r I like, w h e n e v e r I like. Therefore, since I a m free to come to hold any belief I choose, I need not be limited to h o l d i n g beliefs w h i c h my evidence tends to indicate are true.
In fact, the issue of the truth or falsity of what I pro p o s e to b e lieve can be irrelevant to me.
I m a y instead decide to hold only beliefs whi c h are p l e a s i n g to the mind, or w h i c h m y friends hold, or w h i c h I think w i l l m a k e me happy.
I m ay eve n choose m y beliefs r a ndomly if I like; it is m y free choice.
The important point is that the issue of a p r o p o s i t i o n 's truth or falsity n e e d n 't arise or play any role in m y considerations of w h ether or not to believ e it.
To answer the question, ''Should I b e lieve that £ is t r u e ? " I need not consider " Is £ true?" Therefore, considerations relevant to the truth or falsity of £ can be simi l a r l y irrelevant in d e t e rminin g w h e t h e r or not to b e l i e v e £.
So evidence for or against the truth of £ m a y be disregarded.
In order to b e lieve in dependently of evidentia l considerations one need not b e lieve contrary to o n e 's evidence ( o n e 's belief could after all agree w i t h the e vi dence), rather, it m e r e l y m ust be the case that one does not take into account considerations relevant to the truth or falsity of £ in a r riv ing at the belief. The issue immediately arises of w h e t h e r he wants to claim that all beliefs acquired at w i l l are acquired irrespective of truth, or in stead only that if it is possible for me to acquire beliefs at will, then it is possi b l e for me to acquire them irrespective of truth (which is all (1) strictly claims).
As I 've e l a borated the v i e w here, it would be possible for someone to b e lieve at w i l l yet take into account issues relevant to the b e l i e f 's truth or falsity.
W 
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441, m e a n i n g of "belief at will," such that all acquisitions of a b e lief at w i l l are acquisitions irre s pective of truth.
Given this clarification, it is p o ssible to reconstruct the re a s o n ing w h i c h leads W illiams to assume that (1) is true.
It has b e e n determined that it follows from the m e a n i n g of "belief at wil l " that acquiring a belief b^ at w i l l is acquiring b> irrespective of b/s truth. Let us assume that this conceptual connec t i o n is so transparent that we could not ascribe to anyone a belief that he has the ability to acquire beliefs at will wit h o u t as cribing to h i m the be l i e f that he has the ability to acquire beliefs i r r e spective of their truth.
Therefore, if I k n o w I have the ability to beli e v e at will, then I k n o w I have the ability to acquire beliefs irrespective of their truth.
And let us also assume that due to this same conceptual connection, if in full consciousness I w i l l to acquire a belief, then in full consciousness I w i l l to acquire it irrespective of its truth.
Then assume the truth of (7):
that if I can acquire beliefs at w i l l then I k n o w that I can a c quire beliefs at will.
It follows that if I can acquire beliefs at will, then I k n o w that I can acquire beliefs irrespective of their truth.
Then, w i t h one further a s s u m p t i o n -that if I could acquire a b eli ef at will, I could w i l l to acquire it in full consc i o u s n e s s -(1) follows:
that if I could acquire a belief at will, I could w ill in full consciousness to acquire a b e lief i r respective of its truth. I want to grant for the moment ^ all of the steps to this conclusion except the last, and focus on the question of why Williams thinks that if I could believe at will I would be able to do so in full conscious ness. He might hold that it is a consequence of another assumption such as: that it must be possible to perform in full consciousness any thing one does at will. Or he might hold that it is a consequence of a stronger claim: that all acquisition of beliefs at will i_s done in full consciousness-a stipulation about the meaning of "belief at will." The issue of w h i c h reflects W i l l i a m s 1 i n t e n t i o n is important beca u s e it bears on the vali d i t y of the overall argument.
In premises (2) and (3), the "before" and "after the event" cases are to be under s t o o d as before and after the event of w i l l i n g in full consciousness to acquire a belief irrespective of its truth. Therefore, they only e stablish that w i t h regard to no beli e f acquired at wi l l in full consciousness could I believe I had acquired it at will, a w e aker conclusion than ( 4 1).
On this interpretation, e ven if (1)-(3) we r e true, Williams w ould fail to establish ( 4 1), b e c a u s e these premises fail to rule out the p o s s ibility of m y b e l i e v i n g that I h ave acquired beliefs at will, w h e n m y belief w a s not acquired in full consciousness.
Yet Williams
9
Some doubts about the p l a u s i b i l i t y of (7) are raised below. So in what follows I wil l take this further s t i p u lation to be included in the m e a n ing of "belief at w ill" just as I did earlier w i t h "irrespective of truth."
Therefore, (1) should be rewritten:
(lf) Necessarily, if I acquire a belief at will, then I will in full consciousness to acquire it irrespective of truth, and (2) and (3f) should be revised to read:
( 2 f) Necessarily, if in full consciousness I w i l l to acquire a b e lief irrespective of its truth, then b e fore the event it is impossible that I think of it as a be l i e f of mine, (3ff) Necessarily, if in full consciousness I w i l l to acquire a b e lief irrespecti v e of its truth, then after the event it is impossible that I in full consciousness regard it as a belief of mine and also b e lieve that it was acquired at will. This elabo r a t i o n of the concept has deter m i n e d that acquiring a b e lief b^ at w i l l is w i l l i n g to acquire b^ w h i l e not taking into account any considerations relevant to the truth or falsity of b_, and doi n g this in full consciousness.
We can assume that the full consciousness stip u l a tion involves the b e l i e v e r 's awareness that he or she has arrived at or is attempting to arrive at the belief in this way.
G iven these facts, W i l l i a m s argues that such a b e l i e v e r "before the event" could not regard it as a belief purpor t i n g to represent reality, and afterwards could not regard it as a belief of his or hers w h i l e k n o w i n g h o w it originated.
Before the Event needs (4f) for the rest of the argument.Ŵ illiams seems a little less sure about the "before the event" case than about the "after the event" one.
He says that "it is unclear that before the event I could s eriously think of it as a b e l i e f . .
.At the v e r y l e a s t , there must be a r e s t r i c t i o n on what is the case after the event" (my emphasis).
F r o m the t e m p o rizing re m a r k "it is unclear," it seems that Williams in ( 2 1) is actually pur s u i n g a thought peripheral to the m a i n line of argument, and that his "at the v e r y least" w h i c h prefaces (3) functions to b r i n g us b a c k to the line of reas o n i n g in w h i c h he A (5f) w e a kened so as to m ake the rest of the argument w o r k -if w i t h respect to every a cquisit i o n of a bel i e f at w i l l in full consciousness I have performed it is n e ce s s a r y that I not b e lieve it took place, then I could not k n o w that I was able to acquire beliefs at w i l l -would be im plausible, since I might still come to k n o w I could acquire beliefs at wil l by n oting the times I had done it not in full consciousness.
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In any case, ( 2 f) is not relevant to the re m a i n d e r of the argument.
Since ( 4 f) claims that I could not k n o w that I had acquired a belief at w i l l and the antecedent of ( 5 f) also refers to a past belief-acquisition, only the nafter the event" case is needed. Nevertheless, it is u s eful to examine b r i e f l y the situation of a prospective b e liever at w i l l "before the event," in that it w i l l i llu m i n a t e some of the problems involved in c onceiving of the phenomenon. P resumably prospectiv e believers at will, like the rest of us, already have a number of beliefs; they are to try to add another belief to their pre -e x i s t i n g stock.
In normal b elief-acquisition, adding a b e lief usually requires changing or giving up other beliefs w h i c h are seen to be incompatible wi t h the n e w one.
If I come to believe that my s c h e f fiera has scale, then I no longer b elieve that it does not have scale, and I give up m y bel i e f that s c h e f fieras do not get scale.
This is not to say one cannot h a v e inconsistent beliefs, but it is implausible to hold that an a g e n t 's beliefs could be characterized by no logic whatever.
Some are b e tter at seeing the implications of what they believe than others, but everyone sees some i mplications of his or her beliefs.
The fact that we usu a l l y do not a t tribute such r e c ognizably inconsistent beliefs to a p e r s o n has b e e n held to result from the fact that unless some such m i n i m a l degree of i n c o nsistency is ^c r i b e d to a belief set, we cannot attribute any beliefs to the agent.
The question then arises as to w h e t h e r Will i a m s thinks that in b e lief at w i l l the same requirements operate.
If our beli e v e r succeeds in coming to believe £ at will, must he give up other beliefs he sees to be incompatible w i t h £ ?
Suppose he already believes n o t -p ? Or suppose £ is itself obviously inconsistent.
On one inte r p r e t a t i o n of "irrespec tive of truth," no such r e arrangement of beliefs is required; the n e w belief is m e r e l y added to the old stock.
What the argument for this conclusion would be is not clear, due partially to the obscurity of the phrase "purporting to represent reality." Can't any consistent proposition be thought to do this, in the sense that it describes a possible state of the world? 
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If Williams thinks such consistency requirements no longer operate in belief at will, then the i m p o ssibility of belief at w i l l follows d i rectly from the fact that it is impossible to ascribe to someone such ra d i c a l l y inconsistent beliefs.
The argument he gives w o u l d be u n n e c e s sary and his claim wo u l d lose m u c h of its i n t e r e s t . There is no indi c a tion that Williams holds such a view; and there is a p o s i t i o n w i t h r e gard to the consistency requirement w h i c h can m o r e p l a u s i b l y be a t t r i buted to him.
On this view, t hough a belief acquired at w i l l is acquired independently of truth-considerations, a c quiring it does r e quire r e vision of obviously i n c o mpatible p r e -e x i s t i n g beliefs. In other words, the consistency requirements held to operate in n ormal b e l i e f -a c q u i s i t i o n continue to operate here.
If this is W i l l i a m s ' view, then he is not claiming that bel i e f at w i l l is impossible for the r ea son that if I could believe £ at w i l l I could t r ansparently (in all recognition) believe £ and its negation, w h i c h is impossible.
Rather, his argument is designed to e s t a blish that ev e n t hough b e lief at w i l l does not involve inconsis t e n c y of belief, it still is impossible.
I wi l l adopt this i n terpret a t i o n in what follows.
To consider what is involved in the "before the event" situation, then, it is usef u l to imagine a ttempting to acquire a belief w h i c h has v ery little connection w i t h o n e 's other beliefs, a belief, say, about w h i c h one had no previous op i n i o n and w h i c h is p e r f e c t l y possible. Suppose that I have selected as m y target the p r o p o s i t i o n "The next coin tossed w i l l come down heads."
I n o w must come to believe this at will, in full consciousness.
In To believe £ is to take £ to be true, it is to v i e w £ as "representing reality," that is, as ch a r a c t e r i z i n g the way reality actually is.
Tr y i n g to b e l ieve at will, then, is trying to take this attitude towards a p r o p o s i t i o n 's truth w h i l e k n o w i n g that one has taken the issue of its truth or falsity to be irrelevant and that one has ignored all considerations related to this issue.
No won d e r it w o u l d at least be difficult to succeed. Therefore, for clarify A should be rewritten:
A f t e r the Event
A f : I believe Fb is a present bel i e f of mine"! .
The "it" in B refers to the same belief b^ referred to in A, the b e lief w hich was in fact acquired at will.
But B does not explicitly state that I believe that b is a present belief of mine; it says just that I believe that I acquired b_ at will.
Of course, for me to believe that it was acquired at w i l l requires that I think it is a belief w h i c h I held at least one time (since I acquired i t ) . But it is left open as to whe t h e r or not I think of it as a present belief.
Consider the options:
B 1 : I believe_I"l acquired I d at willl and it is not the case that I believe \b_ is a present belief of m i n e H .
B ff: I believe ÏÏ acquired I d at willl and I believe Pb is a present belief of mine~l .
N o w B 1 is inconsistent w i t h A f , in that the n e g a t i o n of A f-it is
not the case that I believe that b is a present belief of m i n e -is a consequence of B f . So, it w i l l be trivially true that A ! and B f c a n 't bot h be true: but this is clearly not the i n consistency Williams had in mind. He does not claim to show that it is impossible that at a certain time I could believe that b is a present belief of m i n e and at a later time come to b e lieve that I had acquired I d at wi l l (so long as I no longer think I b e lieve it).
So it must be B 1 ' w h i c h is alleged to be inconsistent w i t h A ' . H o w ever, B ff entails
So for it to be pla u s i b l e that B fl is impossible, then, each con junct must at least be assumed to have the same time index, i.e., the two beliefs must occur at the same time.
A 
W i l l i a m s ' claim, then, is that I c a n 't be l i e v e that Id -w h i c h I b e
lieve is a present belief of m i n e -was acquired at will. If I do regard something as a belief of mine, then it is not the case that I think I acquired it at will. And should I come to b e lieve that a feeling of convic t i o n about jd's truth w h i c h I had had up to that mo m e n t had ori ginated in this manner, I wou l d have to bel i e v e that this feeling was no longer a belief of mine.
Instead, I could d escribe my present state as an inclination to think jd was true, or a strong h unch that it was, or a feeling of b e i n g favorably d isposed towards jd's truth.
But I could not think that I actually bel i e v e d that jd was true whi l e k n o w i n g that I came to believe it disr e g a r d i n g the issue of its truth.
But note that this claim does not entail that I cannot think I have acquired a belief Id at will; it m e r e l y establishes that if I did think so, it wou l d have to be the case that I did not think that b^ was a p r e sent belief of mine.
Even if B ' ' ' is n e c e s s a r i l y false, B ' remains possible, so it is left as p o s s i b l e that I could think that I had ac quired a past b elief of mine at will, so long as it is a belief w h i c h I did not think I held any longer.
F-9
An Examination of (3''') (3,lf) is a plau s i b l e claim, and I wi l l argue that s omething like it is true.
As a preliminary, it is us e f u l to i nvestigate what there might be about the reali z a t i o n that a partic u l a r belief had be e n acquired at w i l l w h i c h might be thought to prevent me from thinking that I still b e lieved it.
Certain facts seem clear. If I k n e w I had a cquired a belief at will, I wou l d k n o w that I had delibe r a t e l y induced m y believing, and in a w a y w h i c h disregarde d as irrelevant issues related to the b e l i e f 's truth.
I would k n o w that I had deci d e d to take something as true on the basis of considerations w h i c h I k n e w did not count towards its truth or falsity.
And I w ould also k n o w that my belief did not originate through a means w h i c h made it in any w ay likely that the beliefs I acquired by it w ere true.
Therefore, I w ould k n o w that if m y belief did turn out to be true, it would be simply accidental, a m a t t e r of chance, that it did. The d i f ficulty is this: k n o w i n g these facts, h o w can I continue to think that I still take to be true what I came to believe in this m a n n e r .
In typical cases of b e l i ef-acquisition, we think w e arrive at b e liefs in ways such that what w e b e lieve is likely to be true.
The n o r m a l channels through w h i c h we acquire beliefs are thought to be reliable to the extent that if I have no r e a s o n to thi n k m y belief I d was not arrived at in the n ormal way, the me r e fact that I hold is some r e ason to think b^ is true (though of course a far f rom conclusive one, since it is all too easy for us to o b tain false b e l i e f s ) .
I assume, for example, that when my perceptual organs are operating correctly and the conditions are normal, the information they give me is veridical and I can reliably infer from it. So, I think that beliefs arrived at from perception are likely to be true. The same holds for our methods of inference, deductive and inductive; we think that in fol lowing them we at least increase our chances of arriving at truth. But in the case of belief at will I not only lack such assurance about my method of belief-acquisition, I know that the way I am arriving at my beliefs has no connection with the belief's truth. The situation is like that described earlier:
It is this fact w h i c h causes
I can believe that one of m y beliefs is false, but I cannot believe of any p a r ticular belief that it is false (for I would not then believe it).
On the other hand, if C^ff is true, then so is C]/ . If I cannot beli e v e that any of m y bel i e f s are h eld unsustained, then I cannot believe of this partic u l a r one that it is held unsustained.
The claim for w h ich I want to argue is C^1 , the de re r e a d i ng(which is also the sense W illiam s seems to have in mi n d in ( 3 f,f)). If C1 w ere true, then there w ould be implications not only for the case of belief at w i l l but also for any kind of b e l i e f -a c q u i s i t i o n w h i c h does not take into account truth-considerations.
For example, if I were to wake up in the m o r n i n g feeling convinced that the seeds I p l a n t e d had come up, and then find out that I only thought this b e c a u s e I had dreamed they had, it wou l d imply that I w o u l d h ave to no longer think I b elieved they had.
Having clarified Cq_, it is possible to investigate more carefully why C]/ might be thought to be true. One might hold that the reason I can't believe myself to be in the situation of holding the belief I d and believing that my belief is not sustained by truth-considerations is that the situation I would be believing myself to be in is itself con tradictory.
One might hold
C2I
Necessarily, ^ (3x) (3p) (x believes £ and x fs belief of £ is not sustained by truth-considerations).
And one might argue for C^f by claiming that b e c a u s e this s i t uation is so obviously inconsistent, n e c e s s a r i l y no one could regard h i mself as b e ing in it.
I do not take this approach, b e c a u s e C 2 is implausible; it has the consequence that some forms of belief which, though irrational, s eem to occur are declared to be impossible.
It says that one cannot h old a
This claim would have to be clarified and strengthened, since it is possible for us to believe impossible things. Some mathematicians be lieve that Goldbach's conjecture is true, others that it is false. One of these views is a belief in a necessary falsehood, but that does not prevent belief.
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belief as a result of non -t r u t h -r e l a t e d factors, e ven if one is unaware of w h y one holds it. 
So, according to C 2 it is impossible to b e lieve something only b e c a u s e of ps y c h o l o g i c a l causes, for example, it is not
result of factors w h i c h have n o t h i n g to do w i t h the truth of the belief.
Williams himself seems to b e lieve that C 2 is true. In a separate argument in the paper he claims that it is a n e c e s s a r y condition of b e lief that there be a "regular c onnexion b e t w e e n the environment, the perceptions and what the m a n came out wit h " (149), and he uses this fact to arrive d i r ectly at the result that we cannot believe at will.
But he does not use this c l aim in the argument under consideration, and one can argue for w i thout b e i n g committed to C 2, since C1 claims only that it is a n ecessary c onditi o n of one be l i e v i n g that one has a belief that one d o e s n ft believe such a con n e c t i o n is lacking.
If C 2 is false, under s t o o d in the de d icto r e ading (C^' ') is implausible. If it is in fact pos s i b l e to have a belief w h i c h is not sustained by truth-considerations, then I m i g h t come to recognize this fact.
Kno w i n g that it is possible, I mig h t then come to b e lieve that it is true of myself.
Thus, I might come to b e lieve that there is a b (I d o n 't k n o w w h i c h one) w h i c h is a b e lief of mi n e and is not sustained by t r u t h -c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Also, if C 2 is false it is p o s s i b l e that I could believe of someone else, say, Joan, that she has the belief b^ and I d is not sustained by truth-considerations.
Why, then, c a n 't I beli e v e it of myself? To examine the intuition behind C]_, it is ne c e s s a r y to consider an example of a belief o s t ensibly not sustained by t r u t h -c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . I want to examine one such case in some detail, and then argue that the factors w h i c h operate in it would o p erate in any case w h i c h shared the relevant feature of involving someone m a i n t a i n i n g a belief w h e n that pe r s o n thinks the belief is not sustained by t r u t h -c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Imagine a s i tuation where a subject und e r h ypnosis is caused to have a certain belief by the h y p n otist and is later told by her that he b e lieves it only b e cause of her h y p n o t i c suggestion.
Can the subject still think he believes it, k n o w i n g n o w that his feeling of c o n v iction re sulted only from the h y p n o t i s t 's machinations, and that there is there fore no rea s o n to think the belief is true?
The hypnotist mig h t have induced a beli e f for w h i c h the subject already has ample evidence, in w h i c h case the subject w i l l be able to continue to hold the beli e f by b o l s t e r i n g it through these e v i dential F-1 3 considerations.
Or he mig h t believe, for example, that from what he knows of the h y p n o t i s t 's character, she w o u l d only h ave induced true beliefs, so he does have indirect evidence of the b e l i e f 's truth. In these cases, his belief wou l d have o r i ginated w i thout ut i l i z a t i o n of considerations relevant to the b e l i e f 's truth, but he is able to continue to hold it by m a k i n g use of such considerations, only beca u s e his belief is sustained in a different w a y f rom the w a y in w h i c h it was produced.
But suppose the subject is u n able to develop such support for the belief, so that he must continue to b e l i e v e w i t h o u t bei n g in p o s s e s s i o n of considerations relevant to the b e l i e f 's truth: this is the relevant case.
Suppose that the h ypnotist induces a belief that the subject has the ability to be a brilliant opera singer.
And suppose that the subject not only has no evidence for the belief; he has other conflicting beliefs, e.g. that he has never been able to carry a tune, is tone-deaf, has never succeeded in b e ing admitted into even the m ost amateur choir, and in fact seems to cause p ain to those w i t h i n earshot w h e n he m e r e l y tries to hum a tune.
Yet since hypnosis he has found himself convinced that despite these facts, he has this ability. Now, u pon learning w h y he has this feeling of conviction, w i l l he continue to think he believes he has the ability?
Perhaps despite his know l e d g e of its origin some feeling of conviction that he has the ability wi l l persist.
But n o w u n d e r s t a n d i n g why, he cannot continue to credit this feeling w i t h the status of a belief. He can no longer think he believes it is really true that he has this ability; he can only describe the feeling as a strong h u n c h or feeling or suspicion, if indeed it persists at all.
Even in a case w h e r e the subject has no such obvious contrary evidence (as in the example of b e l i e v i n g that the next coin tossed w ill come up heads), the same phenom e n o n w o u l d occur.
K n o w i n g w h y he has the feeling forces h i m to reclassify it as not a genuine belief.
H e cannot really think he thinks it is true whi l e know i n g that he was only caused to h ave the feeling by the hypnotist.
The conclusion suggested by this example w i l l not apply only to the case of beliefs induced by hypnosis. It wi l l hold in any case w h e r e i n one is supposed to regard Id as a beli e f of o n e 's w h i l e b e l i e v i n g that Id
is not sustained by truth-considerations, b e cause the factors w h i c h m a k e such a situation impossible in the hypnosis example w i l l be present in any such case.
Consider, for example, a case of c o n tinuing to be l i e v e I d w h i l e k n owing that one believes t> solely b e c a u s e of a desire that Id be true, and therefore know i n g that one has u t i l i z e d no considerations w h i c h tend to
sho w _b to be true. Suppose I b e l i e v e that m y moth e r loves me, and one day I come to realize that this beli e f of m i n e is not b ased on or sustained by any evidence or data counting towards its truth. I t 's not that I interpret the data as showing that she loves me, or assume she does bec a u s e I think all moth e r s do, for that w o u l d be taking into account truth-considerations.
Rather, I r e alize that no t h i n g relevant to showing that m y belief is true is involved in the m a i n t e n a n c e of m y belief; in fact, I discover I belie v e it simply beca u s e I w ant so m u c h for it to be true and cannot even bear the thought that it is false.
The case is difficult to conceive b ec a u s e in cases w h e r e emotional commitments are involved in the sustainment of the belief, evidential considerations are usually still used, even if m a n i p u l a t e d and selected to support the desired view. The issue has so far bee n described as c o n cerning the conditions w h i c h must be fulfilled in order for one to attribute a belief to oneself. Suppose the experimenters ask h i m to check either the fT r u e f or the fF a l s e 1 boxes on a piece of paper w h e r e the p r opositions are written, and tell h i m that if he gets the answer wrong, he and everyone he cares about w i l l be killed.
But if I really found m y s e l f in that situation, I wo u l d either have to try to come up w i t h relevant t r u t h -considerations to
But this result does not have appl i c a t i o n only to the case of ascribing beliefs to oneself. In examining the issue further, it can be d e t ermined that in addition to C^' , there is a further truth about b e l i e f -a s c r i p t i o n : C^: Necessarily, '''(Sx) (3j>) (I be l i e v e that x believes |x believes £ and x 's belief of £ is not sustained by truth-considerations]).
I c a n 't believe this of x bec a u s e to do so I w o u l d have to take x as ascribing to himself a situation w h i c h it is i mpossible for m e to ascribe to my s e l f (even if the situation itself is not i m p o s s i b l e ) . And what prevents m e from a s c ribin g it to m y s e l f is not m y posse s s i o n of some property w h i c h is peculia r to me. x c a n 't b e l i e v e lie believes £ and x 's belief of £ is not sustained by t r u t h -considerations"] because no
In order to elaborate further considerations w h i c h support this c l aim it is important to distinguish from another cl a i m w i t h w h i c h it can easily be confused: C < _ : Necessarily, ^(3x) (Sg) (x b e l ieves £ and x believes that x 's belief of £ is not sustained b y any t r u t h -c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ) . differs from by the a d dition of a further condition. C^'s conjunct "x believes that x 's belief of £ is not sustained by any t r u t h -c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " implies that x believes that x believes £; therefore C5 is
If the subject does check the fT r u e f boxes, there w i l l be some of the strongest imaginable evidence that he in fact b elieves the propositions.
But even this evidence is insufficient to e s t a blish that the subject believes he has used no considerations supporting the p r o p o s i t i o n s ' truth in arriving at the beliefs.
W e do not even h ave good e v i dence that he has not in fact taken into account such considerations; at best all we are entitled to assume is that the subject pre v i o u s l y ha d no opinion about or evidence for the p r o p o s i t i o n s 1 truth, and that no such evidence appeared to exist in the e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n room.
But it is still p ossible both that the subject believes he has u sed what he takes to be evidence in arriving at the beliefs, and that he actually has used it. For example, he might think that the experimenters would not be so m a l i cious as to encourage h i m to believe things w h i c h were false, and therefore he would have evidence of their truth.
Or he might just think he has such evidence:
he mig h t come to regard, e.g.
the placement of a certain chair in the r oom as evidence (even th o u g h it does not actually support the prop o s i t i o n in question, he thinks it does).
Or he might b e lieve that he did use evidence, e v e n though he cannot n o w remember what it w a s .
The point is that nothi n g the subject did or said w o u l d provide ad e quate evidence to show that he believed that a p a r ticular present belief of his was acquired at w il l (and sustained for no other r e a s o n ) . And we w o u l d be forced to accept one of these alternate interpretations of the p h e n omena as correct to avoid ascribing to the subject an incom p r e h en s i ble position.
If he were to assert that he had b e e n successful in his project, he w o u l d be saying, f?I have disre g a r d e d any considerations w h i c h might tend to show that £ is true or false.
Yet I beli e v e £ is true." W h i l e he need not be committed to a straig h t f o r w a r d contradiction like: "I have no opinion about £ fs truth but I bel i e v e £ , , f it w ould be possible for h i m to assert, "I think the evidence against the truth of £ is c o n clusive, but I n e v e r theles s bel i e v e that £ is t r u e . 1 1 Though people so m e times say things like this, we interpret their a s s ertion to m e a n that while what others or the w o r l d w o u l d take as evidence counts against £ fs truth, they nevertheless (on the basis of factors they alone take to be telling) think £ is true.
E v e n if he knows of no c o n t radictory evidence, he is at least com mitt e d to saying that for all he knows, the evidence m a y be conclusive against £, since he claims to ha v e not taken into account eviden t i a l con siderations in arriving at £.
A n d he also m ust hold that even if he had conclusive evidence against £, he still w o u l d bel i e v e £.
And here again we would find the p o s ition incoherent. Thus, C4 is strongly supported by the impossibility of third-person provided in the experiment for him to give more persuasive indications. attribution to a subject of the r e garding of a present parti c u l a r belief of his as ha v i n g be e n acquired and sustained indep e n d e n t l y of truthconsiderations.
We cannot accept this account of the situation. If we accept that the subject thinks he is not c o n sidering w h e t h e r or not _p is true and really thinks he has disregarded any considerations he takes to be relevant to this issue, then w e cannot ascribe to h i m a beli e f that he believes £ is true.
Conversely, if we think he does believe £, then we cannot think he believes he has d i s regarded the e vidential considerations. So no mattter what reward is offered for success in such a psy c h o l o g y experiment, subjects are w e l l -a d v i s e d not to voluntter; they c a n 't win.
A p parent Counterexamples to the C l aim H a v i n g distinguished C 4 from some similar claims, it is u seful to con sider some situations w h i c h m i ght appear to be counterexamples to it and determine h o w the v i e w wou l d h a n d l e them. E x a m i n a t i o n of these cases helps further clarify and support the claim.
These are situations in w h i c h people might claim to believe s omething on the basis of no consi derations relevant to the truth of what they believe, and it is at first sight not implausible to think that they do be l i e v e that they are in this situation.
Two e speciall y strong examples are cases of psychic and religious belief.
Psychics sometimes claim that they k n o w things directly without b e i n g in p o s s e s s i o n of anything w h i c h shows the m to be true.
Consider a speci fic case.
Suppose it is true (as a doc u d r a m a has it) that b e f o r e the sinking of the Titanic, several p eople called the steamship company to say they had a p r e m o n i t i o n that it was going to sink.
N o w can this p r e m o n i t i o n be correctly described as a belief w h i c h the psychics think they hold not on the basis of considerations w h i c h tend to show that it is true?
For m a n y such cases, the p r e m o n i t i o n in qu e s t i o n w o u l d not be described as amoun t i n g to a belief by the psychic.
Rather, it w o u l d be c h aracter ized as a feeling of appr e h e n s i o n or dread, a worry, or a hunch; the p sychic did not think she actually b e l i e v e d the T i t anic would sink. This is what u s u ally goes on, for example, in cases of gambling where one suddenly feels that the dice w i l l come up seven; one w o u l d h e sitate to characterize such a feeling as a belief.
But suppose that the p sychic says she is absolutely convinced it w i l l sink.
Th e n we cannot take her to think that n o t h i n g shows it to be true. In order for her pos i t i o n to be intelligible, w e must assume that she has had some sort of "psychic experience" w h i c h led h er to the b e l i e f -for example, a v i s i o n of a ship sinking w i t h the name "Titanic" across its bow, and that she thinks that the Titanic w i l l sink because she thinks that her ha v i n g had this experience shows that the p r o p o sition is true (or is likely to be true). She might think her evidence is bad, or w o u l d n 't be regarded as evidence b y most people, but she thinks there is some evidence.
If she genuinely regards herself as b e l i e v i n g that the Titanic w i l l sink, then she d o e s n Tt think there is no r e a s o n to think it will.
The case of religious beli e f can be e x p l ained in a similar vein. It has b e e n claimed by some p h i losophers and theologians that it is possible to believe and regard oneself as b e l i e v i n g that God exists, as a leap of faith on the b asis of no e v i d e n c e -and in fact that such belief is the desirable form of religious belief.
For an e x ample of such be l i e f w e cannot turn to cases in w h i c h belief is based on the Bible, on the tes t i m o n y of holy men, on m y s t i c a l visi o n s or on the fact that the existence of God provides the best ex p l a n a t i o n of events in this world. Other, n o n -e v i d e n t i a l factors also play a role in b e l i e f -a c q u i s i tion.
Such cases are ones in w h i c h the basi s of the b e lief is taken to count towards its truth. E liminating such cases, it is impossible to conceive of someone w h o takes himself to belie v e that God exists and also genuinely thinks that there is no reason to think this, that he knows of n o t h i n g w h i c h tends to show that the p r o p o s i t i o n is true.
The P o s s ibility of Conscious I r rationality E ven though can hand l e such apparent counterexamples, there is an objection to it w h i c h is p o t e n t i a l l y more damaging. It might be argued that the claim rests on a t o o-simplistic p i c t u r e of b e l i e f -a c q u i s i t i o n
For example, we are not e m o t i o n a l l y neu t r a l towards all the things we believe; we sometimes have m u c h at stake in their b eing true and w i l l try to m a i n t a i n them at all costs.
W e try to e x p l a i n away conflicting dat a in order to cling to such emotio n a l l y entre n c h e d beliefs:
e.g., I m a y ascribe bias to my examiners rather t han accept a bad test score as evidence against my intellectual abilities.
I can beli e v e things b e c a u s e certain needs and desires I have are satisfied in doing so.
Because it is true that w e beli e v e some things prim a r i l y bec a u s e of such non -e v i d e n t i a l factors, one m i ght argue that we can hold beliefs w h i c h we think a r e n ft justified by our overall evidence.
And it is not implausible that w e could be led to think this about a parti c u l a r b e lief and yet realize that we continue to hold it.
A m a n m a y come to see that his belief that his w i f e is unf a i t h f u l is not supported by the evidence and realize that he really holds the belief b e cause of gen eral attitudes about w o m e n d e v e loped as a result of childhood experiences involving his mother.
But his be l i e f that his w i f e is u nfaithful need not then immediately evaporate; he m a y continue to h o l d it and realize from his b e h avior that he h a s n 't shaken i t . 17 Similar issues can be raised w i t h respect to H u m e 's claim (in his study) that he has no r eas o n to bel i e v e any of the things he does about the u n o bserved but that he continues to hold the beli e f s nonetheless. In the former case, whi l e one thinks one has used some evidence, one thinks it is inadequate; in the latter one thinks one has used no evidence; in bo t h cases one thinks o n e 's belief is not justified by the overall e v i d e n t i a l considerations.
It wou l d se e m that if we can ascribe continued belief in one case, we ought to be able to in the other also. One needs to ques t i o n wh e t h e r the m a n really has a conjoined belief that his wife is u n f aithfu l and that it is u n r e a s o n a b l e to think his wi f e is unfaithful.
Does h e be lieve these things together, at the same time? A better i n t e rpretation is that he wavers; in the a n a l y s t 's office, he thinks the belief is unreasonable, and for the mo m e n t no longer thinks she is unfaithful; after he leaves and finds that his w i f e h a s n 't yet re turned home, he again thinks she is h a v i n g an affair and no longer finds this belief unreasonable.
Writers on s e l f -d e c e p t i o n sometimes have be e n led to m a k e the same disti n c t i o n in terms of b e l i e v i n g at different "levels":
at one level the m a n thinks she is u n f a i t h f u l but at another ("in his heart") he knows it is u n r e a s o n a b l e to think this.
These kinds There is still controversy about what the pr o p e r analysis is of the phe n o m e n a surrounding self-deception, and I do not p r opose to settle that here.
It is only n e cessar y to point out that it is possi b l e to describe these phe n o m e n a of h u m a n i r r a t ionality in ways w h i c h are compatible w i t h the truth of Cg, and the e x a m i n a t i o n shows that Cg is a v e r y p l a u sible claim resulting from facts about belief-ascription. This v e r s i o n clarifies the de dicto-de re ambiguity of e arlier formu lations and also m odifies them by r e p l a c i n g the c l aim that I c a n 't b e lieve that I acquired lb at w i l l wi t h the claim that I c a n 't believe Id is sustained at will. This m o d i f i c a t i o n is n e c e s s a r y b e c ause an e x a m i n a tion of the u n d e r l y i n g argument showed that only the w eaker claim could (and was intended to) be supported; there was found to be no d i fficulty in b e lieving that a present belief had been acquired at w i l l so long as one no longer b e lieved that it was sustained on the basis of no truthconsiderations . It is n o w possible to r e turn to the r e mainder of the argument to d e t e r m ine whet h e r e ven given the truth of ( 3 '' ' '), Will i a m s can e s t a blish his conclusion that it is impossible to acquire b eliefs at will.
The Remainder of the Argument (3 ' '' ') is we a k e r than the earlier formulations; after h a v i n g b e e n m o d ified to be clear and plau s i b l e it is in fact too w e a k to support ( 4 ').
( 4 ') d a i m s that I cannot b e l i e v e of a belief that I have acquired it at will; (4f) did not follow ev e n f rom (3111).
( 3 '' ') leaves it as possi b l e that there are beliefs w h i c h I could beli e v e w e r e acquired at will; I m e r e l y c a n 't b e lieve it of present ones.
And (3ffTf) leaves still a further option.
It allows it as possible that I even bel i e v e that I d is a present belief w h i c h I had acquired at will, so long as I n o w do not believe it is sustained in the same way.
If ( 
W h y does W illiams think this is true?
It c a n 't be that he takes it to follow from a m ore general p r i n c i p l e that one can only learn one has an ability from observ a t i o n of h a v i n g e x e r cised it. Such a principle is false:
I W illiams mus t be relying on the d i s tinctive fact about be l i e v i n g at w ill that it is an ability such that I n e c e s s a r i l y c a n 't k n o w I 've e x e r cised it w i t h respect to a par t i c u l a r belief.
The antecedent of ( 5 ') should be interpreted to mean:
460
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R:
W i t h respect to every acquis i t i o n a of a belief at w i l l I have performed, it is n e c e s s a r i l y not the case that I believe of a. that a. occurred.
It follows that if I think I do b e l ieve b^, then ev e n if t) in fact re sulted from a. I d o n 't believe that t) arose from a_.
N o w R does not establis h that I n e c e s s a r i l y c a n 't believe that I have acquired beliefs at will, or even that I n e c e s s a r i l y c a n 't b e l ieve that there is among my present beliefs a belief w h i c h I acquired at will. It just says that I c a n 't bel ieve of a par t i c u l a r instance of such an acqui sition that it is such an instance.
But if these other possibilities r e m a i n open, it is possi b l e for me to come to k n o w I have the ability to believe at will.
It is e v e n left as po s s i b l e that I could believe I have exercised i t . Similarly, in the belief at w i l l case I could k n o w that it is poss i b l e for me to do it (perhaps I have seen others do i t ) , and eve n that I have done it (perhaps others tell me I do it all the t i m e ) , eve n though I can not be aware that a p artic u l a r case is an instance of h a v i n g done i t . So (5f) seems false and therefore (6 ) is not e s t a b l i s h e d -that I cannot k n o w I am able to a cquire beliefs at will.
(7) is also a controversial premise. Wh a t is it about beli e v i n g at w i l l that leads Williams to think that if we had this ability, we wo u l d k n o w we had it?
This claim requires justification, e s pecially in the light of the fact that it is certainly not true of every ability w e have that we k n o w we have it; we can discover that we have abilities we were never aware of having.
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This example was suggested to me by Ronald Scales; it is useful for present purposes, even though it is not d i r ectly analogous since forget ting is not a basic action.
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Williams clearly thinks there is s o mething special about the ability to acquire beliefs at w i l l wh i c h r e q uires that the p o s s e s s o r be aware of its possession.
It is a basic a c t i o n and, Willi a m s says, it is one we w i l l to p e r f o r m in full consciousness. T he earlier e x a m i n a t i o n of the "in full consciousness" requirement s u ggested that it should be u n d e rstood as stipulating that the believer is aware that he is trying to induce his belief independently of any truth-considerations.
So in acquiring a b e lief at w i l l one w ould be aware of what one was doing.
But even if a c quiring beliefs at w i l l is the kind of ability such that in e x e rcising it one is aware of e x ercising it, it does not f o l l o w that if I can acquire beliefs at will I am aware of this ability.
We have already seen that one m a y be u naware of an ability one has to p e r f o r m an action; it can be shown that this is also p o s sible in the case of basic actions done in full consciousness.
Take the case of the ability to lower o n e 's rate of heartbeat. Sup pose that this can be done directly, b a s i c a l l y (we are not here concerned w i t h methods involving thinking of calm spring days, etc.).
A nd suppose I can do it in full consciousness, if I have the ability. D espite these facts, one could easily be u n a w a r e of the fact that one possesses this ability, as we in the W e s t e r n w o rld w e r e u n t i l recently. The second stage as it stands, then, fails to est a b l i s h the conclusion that we cannot acquire beliefs at will. However, a m o r e pla u s i b l e second stage might be developed, m o d i f y i n g (7) slightly. Since a c q u iring b e liefs at w i l l is always done in full consciousness, one m i ght hold that if x did acquire a belief at will, there w o u l d be an actual time at w h i c h x was aware both that x believed p_ and that x fs bel i e f of j> was sustained at w i l l (which contradicts (3ffff)).
But in fact all the "in full con sciousness" s t ipulation requires is that bef o r e the event one be aware of what one is doing, namely, that one is trying to believe something at will.
It is not required that at the time w h e n one first succeeds in b e lieving it, one still has this awareness; afterwards I m i ght think that I had not succeeded in acquiring 1 ) at w i l l but instead had just happ e n e d to come to believe it. This case is analogous to that of someone, hooked up to a m achine in an experiment, w h o is trying to lower his rate of h e a r t beat and then succeeds in lowering it, but thinks the lowering was brought about by the machine instead of b y his o wn efforts. Or, I m i ght be struck by amnesia at the mo m e n t of a c q u i s i t i o n and simply find mys e l f w i t h a b e lief, acquired I k n o w not how. N e v e r theless, it itself is a v a l u a b l e insight about the n a ture of beliefascription, and it has b e e n shown to be an instance of a mo r e general truth w h i c h has important implications for other forms of belief. It establishes that though m a n y kinds of irrational b e l i e f -a c q u i s i t i o n are possible for us, at least we c a n 't be so irrational as to think w e b e lieve something whi l e thinking that the reas o n w h y we believe it has no connection w ith the truth of what we believe.
However, one could pursue this line w i t h further m o d i f i c a t i o n s and hold instead that if it is
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